Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA): Difference between revisions

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==DMCA’s Safe Harbors for Online Service Providers==
The '''Digital Millennium Copyright Act''' ('''DMCA''') is a United States copyright law that implements two 1996 treaties of the [[World Intellectual Property Organization]] (WIPO). It criminalizes production and dissemination of technology, devices, or services intended to circumvent measures (commonly known as [[digital rights management]] or DRM) that control access to copyrighted works. It also criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not there is actual infringement of copyright itself. In addition, the DMCA heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet. Passed on October 12, 1998 by a unanimous vote in the United States Senate and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998, the DMCA amended [[Title 17 of the United States Code|Title 17]] of the [[United States Code]] to extend the reach of copyright, while limiting the liability of the Online service provider for [[copyright infringement]] by their users.


===Limitations on Liability===
On May 22, 2001, the European Union passed the [[Copyright Directive]] or EUCD, which addresses some of the same issues as the DMCA. The DMCA's principal innovation in the field of copyright, the exemption from direct and indirect liability of internet service providers and other intermediaries (Title II of the DMCA), was separately addressed, and largely followed, in Europe by means of the separate [[Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002|Electronic Commerce Directive]]. (Unlike U.S. federal laws and regulations, the execution of European Union directives usually requires separate legislation by or within each of the Union's member states.)
“Safe Harbors” are limitations on liability, not copyright exceptions. “The [safe harbor] limitations … protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement. Monetary relief is defined in subsection [(k)(2)] as encompassing damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other form of monetary payment. These subsections also limit injunctive relief against qualifying service providers to the extent specified in subsection [(j)].” U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (S. Rpt. 105-190), 20, http://www.hrrc.org/File/S._Rept._105-190.pdf (last visited on 6/14/09) [hereinafter “Senate Report”].


Injunctive relief is limited to the following for conduct falling within the 512(a) “conduit” safe harbor (see below).
==Provisions==
===Title I: WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act===
DMCA Title I, the [[WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act]], amends U.S. copyright law to comply with the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted at the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in December 1996.  The treaties have two major portions. One portion includes works covered by several treaties in U.S. copy prevention laws and gave the title its name. For further analysis of this portion of the Act and of cases under it, see [[WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act]].


# “An order restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is using the provider's service to engage in infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(B).
The second portion is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. However, section 1201(c) of the title clarified that the title does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses. The title contains other limitations and exemptions, including for research and [[reverse engineering]] in specified situations.
# “An order restraining the service provider from providing access, by taking reasonable steps specified in the order to block access, to a specific, identified, online location outside the United States.” Id.  


Injunctive relief is limited to the following for conduct falling within the 512(b), (c) or (d) safe harbors (see below).
===Title II: Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act===
DMCA Title II, the [[Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act]] ("OCILLA"), creates a [[safe harbor]] for online service providers (OSPs, including Internet service providers against copyright liability if they adhere to and qualify for certain prescribed safe harbor guidelines and promptly block access to allegedly infringing material (or remove such material from their systems) if they receive a notification claiming infringement from a copyright holder or the copyright holder's agent. OCILLA also includes a counternotification provision that offers OSPs a safe harbor from liability to their users upon notice from such users claiming that the material in question is not, in fact, infringing. OCILLA also provides for [[subpoena]]s to OSPs to provide their users' identity.


# “An order restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's system or network.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A).
===Title III: Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act===
# “An order restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order.” Id.
DMCA Title III modified [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/117.html section 117] of the copyright title so that those repairing computers could make certain temporary, limited copies while working on a computer.
# “Such other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose.” Id.  
It reversed the precedent set in ''MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.'', 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).


Falling outside the safe harbors does not make one liable for infringement.
===Title IV: Miscellaneous Provisions===
DMCA Title IV contains an assortment of provisions:
*Clarified and added to the duties of the Copyright Office.
*Added ephemeral copy for broadcasters provisions, including certain [[statutory license]]s.
*Added provisions to facilitate distance education.
*Added provisions to assist libraries with keeping phonorecords of sound recordings.
*Added provisions relating to collective bargaining and the transfer of movie rights.


# “The failure of a service provider's conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(l).
===Title V: Vessel Hull Design Protection Act===
# “New section 512 does not define what is actionable copyright infringement in the online environment, and does not create any new exceptions to the exclusive rights under copyright law. … Even if a service provider’s activities fall outside the limitations on liability specified in the bill, the service provider is not necessarily an infringer; liability in these circumstances would be adjudicated based on the doctrines of direct, vicarious or contributory liability for infringement as they are articulated in the Copyright Act and in the court decisions interpreting and applying that statute, which are unchanged by section 512. In the event that a service provider does not qualify for the limitation on liability, it still may claim all of the defenses available to it under current law.” Senate Report, 55.
DMCA Title V added sections [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/1301.html 1301] through [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/1332.html 1332] to add a ''[[sui generis]]'' protection for boat hull designs. Boat hull designs were not considered covered under copyright law because they are useful articles whose form cannot be cleanly separated from their function.
# See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (“These safe harbors limit liability but ‘do not affect the question of ultimate liability under the various doctrines of direct, vicarious, and contributory liability.’”); Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same); Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same).  


Thus compliance with the requirements of the safe harbors is optional for service providers, not mandatory. The increased certainty provided by the safe harbors, however, creates a strong incentive for service providers to take advantage of them, if they can.
==Anti-circumvention exemptions==
In addition to the safe harbors and exemptions the statute explicitly provides, [http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap12.html#1201 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)] requires that the Librarian of Congress issue exemptions from the prohibition against circumvention of access-control technology. Exemptions are granted when it is shown that access-control technology has had a substantial adverse effect on the ability of people to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted works.


===Causes of Action===
The exemption rules are revised every three years. Exemption proposals are submitted by the public to the Registrar of Copyrights, and after a process of hearings and public comments, the final rule is recommended by the Registrar and issued by the Librarian. Exemptions expire after three years and must be resubmitted for the next rulemaking cycle. Consequently, the exemptions issued in the prior rulemakings, in 2000, 2003 and 2006 are no longer valid.
The DMCA safe harbors only apply to copyright infringement, not trademark or patent infringement or other causes of action. Most service providers, however, also enjoy broad immunity from most state law causes of action because of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”). See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (CDA 230 preempts all state intellectual property statutes, including right of publicity); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55 (Cal. 2006).


===Functions Covered Under DMCA Safe Harbors===
The current administratively-created [http://www.copyright.gov/1201/ exemptions], issued in July 2010, are:
The DMCA safe harbors only apply to “service providers” (defined below) performing certain “functions” (defined in § 512(a), (b), (c) and (d)). “To qualify for these protections service providers must meet the conditions set forth in subsection [(i)], and service providers’ activities at issue must involve a function described in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d) or [(g)], respectively.” Senate Report, 41. Accordingly, copyright owners have an incentive to characterize their lawsuits as involving activities that fall outside the defined functions protected by the safe harbors (e.g., intermediate copying, trans-coding, server-side data processing).


# '''512(a): “Conduit” or ISP Safe Harbor'''
*Motion pictures on DVDs that are lawfully made and acquired and that are protected by the Content Scrambling System when circumvention is accomplished solely in order to accomplish the incorporation of short portions of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism or comment, and where the person engaging in circumvention believes and has reasonable grounds for believing that circumvention is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the use in the following instances:
**Educational uses by college and university professors and by college and university film and media studies students;
**Documentary filmmaking;
**Noncommercial videos. (A new exemption in 2010, similar to a previous educational exemption.)
*Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, with computer programs on the telephone handset. (A new exemption in 2010.)
*Computer programs, in the form of firmware or software, that enable used wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telecommunications network, when circumvention is initiated by the owner of the copy of the computer program solely in order to connect to a wireless telecommunications network and access to the network is authorized by the operator of the network. (Revised from a similar exemption approved in 2006.)
*Video games accessible on personal computers and protected by technological protection measures that control access to lawfully obtained works, when circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose of good faith testing for, investigating, or correcting security flaws or vulnerabilities, if:
**The information derived from the security testing is used primarily to promote the security of the owner or operator of a computer, computer system, or computer network; and
**The information derived from the security testing is used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate copyright infringement or a violation of applicable law. (A new exemption in 2010.)
*Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete. A dongle shall be considered obsolete if it is no longer manufactured or if a replacement or repair is no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace. (A renewed exemption from 2006, based on a similar exemption approved in 2003.)
*Literary works distributed in e-book format when all existing e-book editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access controls that prevent the enabling either of the book’s read-aloud function or of screen readers that render the text into a specialized format. (A renewed exemption from 2006, based on a similar exemption approved in 2003.)


    This is the most expansive safe harbor for a service provider, as it has the fewest prerequisites and disqualifiers, but it is only available to those who can meet the narrow definition of “service provider” and only covers “conduit” activities that fall within the statutory language. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that AOL’s provision of Usenet newsgroups to subscribers falls within 512(a)).
The Copyright Office approved two exemptions in 2000; four in 2003; six in 2006 and 2010. In 2000, the Office exempted (a) "Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software applications" (renewed in 2003 but not renewed in 2006); and (b) "Literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness."  (revised and limited in 2003 and again in 2006).  In 2003, the 2000 "literary works including computer programs" exemption was limited to "Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete" and this exemption was renewed in both 2006 and 2010.  The 2003 exemption for text readers of ebooks was renewed in both 2006 and 2010.  The 2003 exemption for obsolete software and video game formats was renewed in 2006 but was not renewed in 2010. The 2000 filtering exemption was revised and renewed in 2003, but was not renewed in 2006. The 2006 exemption for sound recordings allowed after security flaws were found in Sony BMG CD copy protection scandal on some Sony CDs was not renewed in 2010. An exemption covering the audiovisual works included in the educational library of a college or university’s film or media studies department was not renewed in 2010.  This exemption was replaced with an exemption on DVDs protected by the Content Scrambling System when circumvention is for the purpose of criticism or comment using short sections, for educational, documentary or non-profit use. The 2006 exemption for wireless handsets connecting to wireless networks was revised in 2010 to specify used handsets and require authorization from the wireless network operator. Another exemption for wireless handsets was introduced in 2010 specific to interoperability software on the phone itself.


    “A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connections, if (1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service provider; (3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the request of another person; (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and (5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of its content.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
==Linking to infringing content==
The law is currently unsettled with regard to websites that contain links to infringing material; however, there have been a few lower-court decisions which have ruled against linking in some narrowly prescribed circumstances. One is when the owner of a website has already been issued an injunction against posting infringing material on their website and then links to the same material in an attempt to circumvent the injunction. Another area involves linking to software or devices which are designed to circumvent DRM ([[digital rights management]]) devices, or links from websites whose sole purpose is to circumvent copyright protection by linking to copyrighted material.


    “Subsections (a)(1) through (5) limit the range of activities that qualify under this subsection to ones in which a service provider plays the role of a ‘conduit’ for the communications of others.” Senate Report, 41. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 512(a) provides a broad grant of immunity to service providers whose connection with the material is transient.”).
There have been no cases in the US where a website owner has been found liable for linking to copyrighted material outside of the above narrow circumstances.


# '''512(b): Caching'''
==Notable court cases==


    There is very little case law on the 512(b) safe harbor, and it is not clear that the statutory language adequately addresses the sophisticated caching activities that have arisen since 1998. However, one court has held that Google’s Web cache is covered by 512(b). See Field v. Google, 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
===Edelman v. N2H2===
In July 2002, [http://aclu.org American Civil Liberties Union] filed a lawsuit on the behalf of Benjamin Edelman, a computer researcher at Berkman Center for Internet and Society, seeking a [[Declaratory judgment]] to affirm his first amendment rights when reverse engineering the censorware product of defendant N2H2 in case he intended to publish the finding. N2H2 filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted.


    “For subsection (b) to apply, the material must be made available on an originating site, transmitted at the direction of another person through the system or network operated by or for the service provider to a different person, and stored through an automatic technical process so that users of the system or network who subsequently request access to the material from the originating site may obtain access to the material from the system or network. Subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5) further refine the circumstances under which subsection (b) applies….” Senate Report, 42.
===RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, Inc.===
In August 2009, the DVD Copy Control Association won a lawsuit against RealNetworks for violating copyright law in selling its RealDVD software, allowing users to copy DVDs and store them on a harddrive. The DVD Copy Control Association claimed that Real violated the DMCA by circumventing anti-piracy measures [[ARccOS Protection]] and [[Rovi Corporation#RipGuard|RipGuard]], as well as breaking Real's licensing agreement with the MPAA's Content Scrambling System.


    “In terminology describing current technology, this storage is a form of “caching,” which is used on some networks to increase network performance and to reduce network congestion generally, as well as to reduce congestion and delays to popular sites. This storage is intermediate in the sense that the service provider serves as an intermediary between the originating site and ultimate user. The material in question is stored on the service provider’s system or network for some period of time to facilitate access by users subsequent to the one who previously sought access to it.” Senate Report, 42.
===Viacom Inc. v. YouTube, Google Inc.===
On March 13, 2007, Viacom filed a lawsuit against YouTube and its corporate parent Google for copyright infringement seeking more than $1 billion in damages. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.


# '''512(c): Hosting'''
Viacom claims the popular video-sharing site was engaging in "massive intentional copyright infringement" for making available a contended 160,000 unauthorized clips of Viacom's entertainment programming. Google lawyers say they are relying on the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act to shield them from liability.


    Safe harbor applies for any “infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider…” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). “Examples of such storage include providing server space for a user’s web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in which material may be posted at the direction of users.” Senate Report, 44.
On June 23, 2010, U.S. District Judge Louis Stanton granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court held that YouTube is protected by the safe harbor of the DMCA. Viacom has said that it will appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as soon as possible.


    The 512(c) safe harbor requires designation and registration of a “copyright agent” and implementation of a “notice-and-takedown” regime (see below). This safe harbor is also subject to two disqualifiers: “actual or red flag knowledge” and “control + direct financial benefit” (see below).
===IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.===
On June 23, 2006 IO Group, Inc. filed a complaint against Veoh Networks, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for California's Northern District.
IO Group alleged that Veoh was responsible for copyright infringement by allowing videos owned by Io Group to be accessed through Veoh's online service without permission over 40,000 times between the dates June 1 and June 22.


    Numerous activities beyond “providing server space for a user’s web site, for a chatroom, or other forum” have been found to fall within the 512(c) safe harbor. See, e.g., Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (video hosting); Corbis v. Amazon, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (Amazon zShops); CoStar v. LoopNet, 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (user-generated real estate listings); Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (eBay listings).
Veoh is a Flash video site relying on user contributed content. IO Group argued that since Veoh transcoded user uploaded videos to Flash format it became a direct infringer and the materials were under their direct control, thereby disqualifying them for DMCA safe harbor protection.


    The 512(c) safe harbor extends to automated functions (e.g., post-upload processing, extracting thumbnails, transcoding, streaming, downloading) that facilitate access and are closely related to storage of materials at the direction of users. See Universal Music Group v. Veoh Networks, 2008 WL 5423841 at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (“The four software functions that UMG challenges fall within the scope of § 512(c), because all of them are narrowly directed toward providing access to material stored at the direction of users.”); Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147-48 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding post-upload transcoding and thumbnail extraction covered by 512(c) safe harbor).
The ruling judge disagreed with the argument, stating that "Veoh has simply established a system whereby software automatically processes user-submitted content and recasts it in a format that is readily accessible to its users. Veoh preselects the software parameters for the process from a range of default values set by the thirdparty software... But Veoh does not itself actively participate or supervise the uploading of files. Nor does it preview or select the files before the upload is completed. Instead, video files are uploaded through an automated process which is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users."


# '''512(d): Information Location Tools (Linking and Search Engines)'''
The Court has granted the Veoh's motion for [[summary judgment]], on the basis of the DMCA, holding that the defendant's video-sharing web site complied and was entitled to the protection of the statute's "safe harbor" provision. Even though Veoh won the court case, it blamed the litigation as one of the causes of its preparing to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy and its subsequent sale to Qlipso.


    Safe harbor applies for any “infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link….” 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
===Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.===
After numerous DMCA takedown notices in response to his eBay listings, Timothy S. Vernor sued Autodesk in August 2007 alleging that Autodesk abused the DMCA and disrupted his right to sell used software he bought at a garage sale. In May 2008, a federal district judge in Washington State dismissed Autodesk's argument that the software's license agreement preempted the seller from his rights under the [[first-sale doctrine]]. In September 2010, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions."


    “The reference to ‘infringing activity’ is intended to refer to wrongful activity that is occurring at the location to which the link or reference refers, without regard to whether copyright infringement is technically deemed to occur at that location or at the location where the material is received. The term information location tools includes, for example: a directory or index of online sites or material such as a search engine that identifies pages by specified criteria, a reference to other online material such as a list of recommended sites, a pointer that stands for an Internet location or address, or a hypertext link which allows users to access material without entering its address.” Senate Report, 47.
===Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.===
In 2007, Stephanie Lenz, a writer and editor from Gallitzin, Pennsylvania made a home video of her 13-month-old son dancing to "Let's Go Crazy" and posted a 29-second video on the video-sharing site YouTube. Four months after the video was originally uploaded, Universal Music Group, which owned the copyrights to the song, ordered YouTube to remove the video enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  


    The 512(d) safe harbor requires designation and registration of a “copyright agent” and implementation of a “notice-and-takedown” regime (see below). It is also subject to two disqualifiers: “actual or red flag knowledge” and “control + direct financial benefit” (see below).
Lenz notified YouTube immediately that her video was within the scope of fair use, and demanded that it be restored. YouTube complied after six weeks—not two weeks, as required by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act—to see whether Universal planned to sue Lenz for infringement. Lenz then sued Universal Music in California for her legal costs, claiming the music company had acted in bad faith by ordering removal of a video that represented fair use of the song.


===Service Provider: Narrow and Broad Definitions===
In August 2008, U.S. District Judge Jeremy Fogel of San Jose, California ruled that copyright holders cannot order a deletion of an online file without determining whether that posting reflected "fair use" of the copyrighted material.
Safe harbors only cover “service providers,” which may be defined narrowly or broadly. To qualify for the 512(a) “conduit” safe harbor, one must satisfy the narrow definition of “service provider.” In contrast, to qualify for the 512(b), (c) or (d) safe harbors, one must only satisfy the broad definition.


# '''Narrow Definition for 512(a) “Conduit” Safe Harbor'''
On February 25, 2010, Judge Fogel issued a ruling rejecting several of Universal's affirmative defenses, including the defense that Lenz suffered no damages.


    “As used in [section 512](a), the term ‘service provider’ means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A). For example, traditional ISPs, like Verizon or Comcast, that provide simple bandwidth fit the narrow definition of service provider.
==Criticisms==
===Takedown Notice===
The DMCA has been criticized for making it too easy for copyright owners to encourage website owners to take down allegedly infringing content and links which may in fact not be infringing. When website owners receive a takedown notice it is in their interest not to challenge it, even if it is not clear if infringement is taking place, because if the potentially infringing content is taken down the website will not be held liable. The [http://eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation] senior IP attorney Fred von Lohmann has said this is one of the problems with the DMCA.


    There has been some uncertainty regarding the outer limits of the narrower 512(a) definition, especially as applied to P2P systems where end-users do the transmitting, routing, or provision of connections, rather than the service provider. Compare Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We reject Perfect 10’s argument that CCBill is not eligible for immunity under § 512(a) because it does not itself transmit the infringing material….There is no requirement in the statute that the communications must themselves be infringing….”) with A&M Records v. Napster, 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Napster enables or facilitates the initiation of connections, but these connections do not pass through the system within the meaning of § 512(a).”).
Google asserted misuse of the DMCA in a filing concerning New Zealand's copyright act, quoting results from a 2005 study by Californian academics Laura Quilter and Jennifer Urban based on data from the Chilling Effects (group) clearinghouse. Takedown notices targeting a competing business made up over half (57%) of the notices Google has received, the company said, and more than one-third (37%), "were not valid copyright claims."
   
#''' Broad Definition for Other Safe Harbors'''


    As used in this section, other than [section 512](a), the term ‘service provider’ means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph [512(k)(1)](A).” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). The language of the definition encompasses businesses that operate websites or other Internet services or facilities and likely also company LANs and intranets.
===Effect on Analog Video Equipment===
Analog Copy Protection (ACP), the encryption technology created by Rovi Corporation (Formerly Macrovision), is designed to thwart users' attempts to reproduce content via analog cables. When a DVD is played through an analog video cable and recorded using a VCR, Rovi’s ACP technology will distort the copy partially or completely.


    As one court stated, “A plain reading of [17 U.S.C. § 512(k)] reveals that ‘service provider’ is defined so broadly that we have trouble imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions….” In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.Supp.2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts have held that Amazon, eBay, and Aimster all qualify as “service providers” under this definition. See Corbis v. Amazon.com, 351 F.Supp.2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that Amazon meets DMCA definition of service provider); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court ruling that Aimster is a service provider); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (acknowledging the broad definition of a service provider and stating that eBay “clearly” falls within this definition).
The technology works by adding additional lines to the video signal. In the NTSC video standard, blank lines (vertical blanking intervals) that the user cannot see are used for functions like closed captioning. Rovi Corporation uses these blank lines to implement its ACP technology.


===Prerequisites and Disqualifiers===
The implementation of ACP has been ill-regarded by some video enthusiasts. Many claim that the technology has led to signal issues with VCRs and analog video equipment. Some VCRs misread the encryption used to prevent copying, distorting the video image regardless of whether the recording is original or a copy.


====Prerequisites Applicable to All Safe Harbors (512(i))====
The DMCA has been criticized for forcing all producers of analog video equipment to support the proprietary copy protection technology of Rovi Corporation, a commercial firm. The producers of video equipment are forced by law to support and implement the corporation's proprietary technology. This benefits Rovi Corporation financially, whereas those forced to implement it receive neither profit nor receive compensation.


#'''Policy of Terminating Repeat Infringers'''
Additionally, some criticize the implementation of ACP as a violation of their fair use rights. A recently developed TV-streaming product called the Slingbox uses analog signals to convey video from television to a mobile device. However, the encryption used by ACP blocks analog transmission, rendering the Slingbox unusable. Additionally ACP blocks the use of recording for educational purposes. On one or more accounts, students have not been able to cite and record cable sources properly due to ACP restrictions.


    A service provider must “adopt and reasonably implement, and inform subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
===Effect on research===
The DMCA has had an impact on the worldwide [[cryptography]] research community, since an argument can be made that any cryptanalytic research violates, or might violate, the DMCA. The arrest of Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov in 2001, for alleged infringement of the DMCA, was a highly publicized example of the law's use to prevent or penalize development of anti-DRM measures. While working for ElcomSoft in Russia, he developed ''The Advanced eBook Processor'', a software application allowing users to strip usage restriction information from restricted e-books, an activity legal in both Russia and the United States. Paradoxically, under the DMCA, it is not legal in the United States to provide such a tool. Sklyarov was arrested in the United States after presenting a speech at DEF CON (convention) and subsequently spent nearly a month in jail. The DMCA has also been cited as chilling effect (term) to legitimate users, such as students of [[cryptanalysis]] (including, in a well-known instance, Professor Edward Felten and students at Princeton University), and security consultants such as Niels Ferguson, who has declined to publish information about vulnerabilities he discovered in an Intel Corporation secure-computing scheme because of his concern about being arrested under the DMCA when he travels to the US.


    The statute provides no definition of “repeat infringer”—can mere allegations or DMCA takedown notices make someone a “repeat infringer”? Compare Nimmer & Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.10[B][3] (describing what makes a “repeat infringer” and concluding that allegations or multiple takedown notices alone are insufficient); Corbis v. Amazon, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1105 n.9 (“[N]otices alone do not … conclusively determine that the user is an infringer.”), with Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (multiple 512(c) takedown notices requires termination of the user under 512(i)), aff’d on other grounds, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
===Effect on innovation and competition===
In at least one court case, the DMCA has been used by Open Source software projects to defend against conversion of software (i.e. license violations) that involved removal of copyright notices. This defense can be used even without timely copyright registration, and can generate attorney fee awards, which together make it a useful strategy for Open Source organizations.


    “[A] service provider ‘implements’ a policy if it has a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not actively prevent copyright owners form collecting information needed to issue such notifications.” Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (failing to read emails sent to registered Copyright Agent may not be reasonable implementation); Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that infringer termination policies of video hosting service had been reasonably implemented); Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1176-78 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding little likelihood that defendant had adequately implemented a policy of terminating infringers).
===Reform and opposition===
There are efforts in Congress to modify the Act. Rick Boucher, a Democratic congressman from Virginia, is leading one of these efforts by introducing the [[Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act]] (DMCRA).


    Courts have concluded that a policy is reasonably implemented where a service provider blocked terminated users from re-registering from the same email addresses, but did not also screen users by IP address or other means. See Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[S]ection 512(i) does not require service providers to track users in a particular way or to affirmatively police users for evidence of repeat infringement.”); see also Corbis v. Amazon, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1104 (“The mere fact that [the repeat infringer] appeared on zShops under a different user name and identity does not, by itself, create a legitimate question of fact regarding the procedural implementation of Amazon’s termination policy.”).
A prominent bill related to the DMCA is the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA), known in early drafts as the Security Systems and Standards Certification Act (SSSCA). This bill, if it had passed, would have dealt with the devices used to access digital content and would have been even more restrictive than the DMCA.


#'''Accommodate Technical Measures'''
On the tenth anniversary of the DMCA, the [http://eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation] documented harmful consequences of the anti-circumvention provisions. They document that the DMCA:


    Service provider must “accommodate and not interfere with standard technical measures…used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
# stifles free expression, such as in its use against Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov, Princeton Professor Edward Felten, and journalists;
# jeopardizes [[fair use]];
# impedes competition, such as blocking aftermarket competition in toner cartridges, garage door openers, and enforcing [[walled garden (technology)|walled garden]]s around the iPod; and
# interferes with computer intrusion laws.


    In order to qualify as a “standard technical measure,” the measure must have been developed “pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process,” be available on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms, and not impose “substantial costs” on service providers. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A), (B), and (C).
==See also==
*[http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html Executive Summary - Digital Millennium Copyright Act]
*[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.2281.ENR: H.R.2281 -- Digital Millennium Copyright Act]
*[[Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act]] (1995)
*[[Inducement rule]]
*[[NET Act]], the "No Electronic Theft"
;Proposed US legislation
*[[BALANCE Act]], Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations Act of 2003
*[[Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act]] (INDUCE) (introduced 2004)
*[[Pirate Act]] (introduced 2004)
*[[Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act]] (introduced 2003 & 2005)
*[[Digital Transition Content Security Act]] (introduced 2005)
*[[FAIR USE Act]] (introduced in 2007)
;Related international law
*[[Bill C-60 (38th Canadian Parliament, 1st Session)|Bill C-60]] (Canada — ''proposed'')
*[[Bill C-61 (39th Canadian Parliament, 2nd Session)|Bill C-61]] (Canada — ''proposed'')
*[[Bill C-32 (40th Canadian Parliament, 3rd Session)|Bill C-32]] (Canada — ''proposed'')
*[[DADVSI]] (France — ''Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information'')
*[[Digital Economy Act 2010]] (United Kingdom)
*[[Copyright Directive|EU Copyright Directive]] (European Union)
*[[Protection of Broadcasts and Broadcasting Organizations Treaty]] (''proposed'')
;Proposed international law
*[[Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement]]
;DMCA anti-circumvention cases
*''[[Chamberlain v. Skylink]]''
*''[[Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.]]''
*''[[Universal v. Reimerdes]]''
*[[Dmitry Sklyarov]] in [[United States v. ElcomSoft and Sklyarov]]
*''[[Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components]]''
*''[[321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc.]]''
*''[[Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group LLC]]''
;DMCA damages cases
*''[[Stockwire Research Group, Inc., et al. v. Lebed, et al.]]''
;DMCA notice-and-takedown issues
*[[Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act]] (OCILLA) (more information about the DMCA 512 takedown provisions)
*''[[Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.]]''


    As of 2008, nothing appears to qualify as a “standard technical measure” under the definition of the statute, as no “broad consensus” has emerged from any relevant “multi-industry standards process.”
==External links==
* [http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf U.S. Copyright Office summary of the DMCA]
* [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/ Title 17 of the U.S. Code], Cornell Law School
* [http://www.cybertelecom.org/ip/dmca.htm Cybertelecom's DMCA information and background material]
* [http://www.newmediarights.org/guide/legal/copyright/citizens_legal_guide_digital_millenium_copyright_act_dmca A citizen's guide to the DMCA]
* [http://chillingeffects.org/ ChillingEffects.org], a clearinghouse of DMCA 512 notices and cease and desist letters
* [http://www.marketingdock.com/copyrights/dealing-with-copyright-infringement.php Info on Dealing with Digital Copyrights Infringement including filing DMCA Notices]
* [http://tcattorney.typepad.com/digital_millennium_copyri/2007/08/post.html Interview of Marcia Hoffman from the EFF on Lenz v. Universal DMCA lawsuit]
* Seth Finkelstein, ''[http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/finkelstein_on_dmca.html How To Win (DMCA) Exemptions And Influence Policy]''.
* [http://www.eff.org/issues/dmca The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) page on the DMCA]
* [http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAUnintended10.pdf Unintended Consequences: Ten Years under the DMCA - EFF]
* [http://www.medialaw.in Media Copyrights Law]


====Additional Prerequisites for § 512(b), (c), and (d)====
[[Category:Computer law]]
#''' Designate a Copyright Agent'''
[[Category:United States federal copyright legislation]]
 
[[Category:United States federal criminal legislation]]
    Service providers must designate an agent to receive copyright infringement notices, register the agent with the Copyright Office ($80 filing fee), and make the agent’s contact information available on its website. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2); 37 CFR § 201.38.
 
    The Copyright Office makes the list of registered copyright agents available on its website.
 
#''' Notice-and-Takedown'''
 
    Service providers must “upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph [512(c)](3), respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); see Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding no material issue of fact where service provider responded to takedown notices “on the same day the notice is received (or within a few days thereafter).”).
 
    In order to be effective, takedown notices must be in writing and: (1) contain the physical or electronic signature of claimant; (2) identify the work allegedly infringed; (3) identify the allegedly infringing material sufficiently to permit its removal or limit access; (4) provide information sufficient to contact the party providing the notice; (5) contain a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material is not authorized; and (6) contain a statement that the information in the notice is accurate and, under penalty of perjury, that either the owner or the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). See also Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The statute thus signals that substantial compliance means substantial compliance with all of § 512(c)(3)’s clauses, not just some of them.”); but see ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities, 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that substantial compliance is sufficient in some circumstances).
 
    “The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting the infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.” Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007).
 
    '''Counter-Notice and Putback.''' Section 512(g) creates a “counter-notice” regime protecting service providers from liability both for taking down material in response to infringement notices, and for restoring access (“put-back”) to material upon receiving a “counter-notice” from a subscriber contesting the infringement notice. It is important to note, however, that a “counter-notice” regime is not a prerequisite for the DMCA safe harbor. Instead, it provides a service provider with certain immunities vis-à-vis claims brought by its own subscribers.
 
====Disqualifiers (Only for § 512(c) and (d))====
 
# Actual or “Red Flag” Knowledge
 
    A service provider enjoys the (c) and (d) safe harbors only so long as it:
 
::        i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; or
 
::        (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent [e.g., “red flag” knowledge]; or
 
::        (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material…. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A); § 512(d)(1).
 
    The Senate Report further describes the disqualifiers below.
 
        Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement. Senate Report, 48.
 
        For instance, the copyright owner could show that the provider was aware of facts from which infringing activity was apparent if the copyright owner could prove that the location was clearly, at the time the directory provider viewed it, a ‘pirate’ site of the type described below, where sound recordings, software, movies or books were available for unauthorized downloading, public performance or public display. Absent such ‘red flags’ or actual knowledge, a directory provider would not be similarly aware merely because it saw one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person. The provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief cataloguing visit, to determine whether the photograph was still protected by copyright or was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by copyright, whether the use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair use doctrine. Id.
 
        The important intended objective of this standard is to exclude sophisticated ‘pirate’ directories—which refer Internet users to other selected Internet sites where pirate software, books, movies, and music can be downloaded or transmitted—from the safe harbor. Such pirate directories refer Internet users to sites that are obviously infringing because they typically use words such as ‘pirate,’ ‘bootleg,’ or slang terms in their uniform resource locator (URL) and header information to make their illegal purpose obvious to the pirate directories and other Internet users. Id.; but see Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (“illegal.net and “stolencelebritypics.com” do not constitute red flags, because describing material as “illegal” or “stolen” may be an attempt to increase appeal rather than be an admission; also a site featuring hacked passwords is insufficient to be a red flag of infringement).
 
        In this way, the ‘red flag’ test in section 512(d) strikes the right balance. The common-sense result of this ‘red flag’ test is that online editors and catalogers would not be required to make discriminating judgments about potential copyright infringement. If, however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may be all that is needed for the service provider to encounter a ‘red flag.’ A provider proceeding in the face of such a red flag must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor. Senate Report, 49.
 
        The knowledge or awareness standard should not be applied in a manner which would create a disincentive to the development of directories which involve human intervention. Absent actual knowledge, awareness of infringement as provided in subsection (d) should typically be imputed to a directory provider only with respect to pirate sites or in similarly obvious and conspicuous circumstances, and not simply because the provider viewed an infringing site during the course of assembling the directory.” Id.
 
    Cases interpreting the “knowledge disqualifier” include Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (noncompliant notices do not count toward knowledge, use of “illegal” or “stolen” in domain name does not create red flag knowledge for hosting service); Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[A]pparent knowledge requires evidence that a service provider turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”); Corbis v. Amazon, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108-09 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (neither general knowledge of infringement on the site nor third party notices are not enough to constitute a “red flag”); Hendrickson v. Amazon, 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (Amazon lacked prospective knowledge of infringing DVD sales, even after rights holder informed it that the title in question had never been released on DVD); Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
    Control + Direct Financial Benefit
 
    A service provider will be disqualified from the (c) and (d) safe harbors if it “receive[s] a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B); § 512(d)(2)).
 
    The Senate report explains that:
 
        [i]n determining whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied, courts should take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one. In general, a service provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity’ where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service. Thus, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.’ Nor is subparagraph (B) intended to cover fees based on the length of the message (per number of bytes, for example) or by connect time. It would however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material. Senate Report, 44.
 
    Several courts have held that the mere ability to remove or block access to materials, or to exclude users, is not enough to constitute “right and ability to control” within the meaning of the DMCA safe harbors. See Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he plain language of section 512(c) indicates that the pertinent inquiry is not whether Veoh has the right and ability to control its system, but rather, whether it has the right and ability to control the infringing activity.”) (emphasis in original); Corbis v. Amazon, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
 
    One court has suggested that the “financial benefit” prong “should be interpreted consistent with the similarly-worded common law standard for vicarious copyright liability.” See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Io Group v. Veoh Networks, 586 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (following CCBill). This interpretation is problematic to the extent it may render the safe harbors a dead letter as applied to vicarious liability claims, which is at odds with legislative history that indicates that the safe harbors were meant to reach those claims. See Senate Report, 40 (safe harbors bar monetary damages for “direct, vicarious, or contributory infringement”).
 
===Steps to Take upon Notice of Infringement===
The protection from liability available under Sections 512(c) and (d) of the DMCA applies only if the service provider responds expeditiously to remove or disable access to material in accordance with the DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions. The DMCA shields the service provider from liability upon good faith removal of allegedly infringing material in response to a notice received under the DMCA. The service provider must also respond to any counter notifications received and possibly replace the removed material. Therefore, a service provider should take and document the following steps upon receipt by a designated agent of a proper notice of alleged infringement:
 
    Verify the Notice. Proper notice must substantially comply with the requirements of the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). The notice must: (1) contain the physical or electronic signature of claimant; (2) identify the allegedly infringing material sufficiently to permit its removal or limit access; (3) provide information sufficient to contact the party providing the notice; (4) contain a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material is not authorized; and (5) contain a statement that the information in the notice is accurate and, under penalty of perjury, that either the owner or the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
    Promptly Remove the Material. Upon receipt of a proper notice, promptly remove or disable access to the material in question.
    Notify the Person Whose Material Was Removed. Take reasonable steps to promptly notify the affected user that the material has been removed or access to it has been disabled.
    Notify Complaining Party Upon Receipt of Counter Notification. Upon receipt of a “counter notification” from the affected user, promptly provide the complaining party with a copy of the counter notification, and inform that person that access to the removed material will be restored in 10 business days. A “counter notification” must: (1) contain either the physical or electronic signature of the user; (2) identify the material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled and the location at which such material appeared before its removal or disabling; (3) contain a statement under penalty of perjury that the user has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification; and (4) contain the user’s name, address and telephone number, and a statement that the user consents to the jurisdiction of the federal district court for the jurisdiction where the user is located. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
    Replace Material Unless Complaining Party Proceeds with Infringement Action. Replace the removed material or re-enable access to it in not less than 10 nor more than 14 business days following receipt of the counter notice, unless the designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the original notification that that person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s system.
 
===DMCA Misuse===
Section 512(f) of the DMCA creates a cause of action for a service provider or an end-user against “[a]ny person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification.” Those injured by misrepresentations in DMCA takedown notices or counter-notices are entitled to bring suit and recover actual damages, as well as costs and attorney’s fees. 17 U.S.C § 512(f).
 
“‘Knowingly’ means that a party actually knew, should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations.” Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1204 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (finding misuse when DMCA notice targeted a clear fair use).
 
The Ninth Circuit has held that the “good faith” requirement in sending DMCA takedown notices “imposes a subjective good faith requirement upon copyright owners.” Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting “good faith” in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)). “A copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake. Rather, there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.” Id. at 1005. This standard may prove problematic insofar as it appears to reward unreasonable mistakes on the part of copyright owners—the more unreasonable the person sending the takedown, seemingly the more leeway he would enjoy in sending takedowns. This seems at odds with Congress’ purpose in enacting § 512(f).
 
"'Material' means that the misrepresentation affected the ISP's response to a DMCA letter." Id. See also Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.2004); Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 410 F.Supp.2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005) ('MGA was required to show that it had a sufficient basis to form the required good faith belief that the Plaintiffs’ auction infringed on its rights, and that its actions therefore complied with the notice and takedown requirements under the DMCA.').
 
“[I]n order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with ‘a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,’ the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.” Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1154-55 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
 
====Preliminary Injunctions====
In Novotny v. Chapman, 2006 WL 2335598 (W.D.N.C. 2006) the Court denied a motion for preliminary injunction to stop improper notices, finding "injury is not likely to reoccur since the plaintiffs neither are posting the videos-at-issue on their website, nor have they cited any interest in re-posting these videos before the underlying legal issues are resolved."
 
In Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F.Supp.2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) the Court granted a preliminary injunction to stop improper notices. In that case defendants alleged that plaintiff violated 512(f), but had "not submitted any evidence that plaintiffs were aware or understood that they were misrepresenting the fact that defendants' website was infringing when they filed their notices." The Court held:
 
    While defendants have not demonstrated their likely success on the merits, they have demonstrated sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping in their favor. To succeed on their claim, defendants need only prove plaintiffs knew defendants were not infringing when they submitted the DMCA notices. Defendants have not yet had the opportunity to fully develop this theory. Id. at 469.
 
===DMCA Subpoenas===
Section 512(h) of the DMCA allows copyright holders to subpoena service providers for user identity information without filing a lawsuit.
 
    Recording Ind. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 309, 160 L.Ed.2d 222 (2004), cert. denied sub nom, Verizon Internet Servs., Inc. v. Recording Industry Ass'n of America, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 347, 160 L.Ed.2d 222 (2004). The D.C. Circuit held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the DMCA's subpoena provisions did not apply to cases in which the ISP was merely a conduit for alleged peer-to-peer file transfer. Since the RIAA could not properly send a 512(c)(3)(a) notification of claimed infringement for alleged peer-to-peer infringements, it could not use the 512(h) subpoena that depended on such notification. The court granted Verizon's motion to quash without reaching the constitutional arguments addressed below.
    Recording Industry Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In a consolidated case, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s orders to compel Verizon to disclose the identity of subscribers. The court reasoned that under the DMCA, a subpoena may not be issued to a service provider acting as a conduit for peer-to-peer file sharing, which does not involve the storing of infringing material on its server.
    In re Charter Communications, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005). The 8th Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit's lead, granting Charter's motion to quash subpoenas on the same statutory interpretation grounds.
    Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. RIAA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21659 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Pacific Bell Internet Services challenged subpoenas issued by RIAA, MediaSentry, and Titan Media. That suit was ordered transferred to the D.C. District prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in RIAA v. Verizon, above.
    In re Subpoena To University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 367 F.Supp.2d 945 (M.D.N.C. 2005). The court quashed the Doe subpoena, holding that 512(h) subpoenas are not applicable to 512(a) ISPs.
 
Denial of the RIAA's DMCA subpoenas has not stopped their efforts to identify and sue peer-to-peer infringers. The RIAA's member record labels have turned to Doe lawsuits, filing complaints against as many as 250 Does and then issuing pre-service discovery subpoenas to ISPs to obtain identifying information for the Does. Most courts have granted these discovery requests, despite arguments about the suits' jurisdictional flaws or impingement on constitutionally protected rights to anonymous speech. See EFF's RIAA v. The People.
 
===Case Law Interpreting the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions===
    ALS Scan v. Remarq Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001)
    Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
    Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
    A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
    Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)
    In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002); 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
    Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)
    CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004)
    Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
    Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, No. 04-57143, 04-57207 (9th Cir. March 29, 2007)
 
==Anti-Circumvention and Anti-Trafficking Provisions==
Sections 1201(a) and (b) of the DMCA prohibit the circumvention of technological measures that control access to or uses of copyrighted works and also prohibit trafficking in circumvention technology. Prior to its enactment, courts had permitted the sale of devices that unlocked copyright protection mechanisms on other products, so long as such products were capable of substantial noninfringing uses. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). The DMCA anti-circumvention provisions create civil remedies and provide for criminal sanctions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 1204.
 
===Scope of Circumvention Prohibition===
Section 1201(a) addresses “access control” measures, prohibiting both the conduct of circumventing those measures and devices that circumvent them. Section 1201(a)(1) provides: “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits the manufacture, importation, offering to the public, providing or otherwise trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, or component to circumvent access control measures. Thus, §1201(a) prohibits both the act of circumventing access control measures, as well as trafficking in products, services and devices that circumvent access control measures.
 
Section 1201(b) prohibits the manufacture, importation, offering to the public, providing or otherwise trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, or component to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under the Copyright Act, including the right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, or publicly display a copyrighted work. The type of technological measure addressed in §1201(b) includes copy-control measures and other measures that control uses of works that would infringe the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. The technologies protected by 1201(b) are frequently referred to as "copy controls." Unlike §1201(a), which prohibits both the act of circumvention and trafficking in devices that circumvent, §1201(b) does not prohibit the act of circumventing copy control measures. This preserves the ability to circumvent in order to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted works that are protected by copy control measures.
 
The following grid illustrates the relationship between these concepts:<br>
<br>
 
{| border="1" align="left" style="text-align:center;"
|
|tech controls access to work
|tech controls copying, distribution, public display, public performance of work
|-
|Act of Circumvention
|1201(a)(1)
|no prohibition (general copyright law applicable)
|-
|Trafficking in Circumvention Tools
<br>
|1201(a)(2)
|1201(b)
|}
<br>
 
<br>
===Copyright Office Triennial DMCA Rule-Making===
In the House of Representatives, the DMCA was sequentially referred to the Committee on Commerce after it was reported out of the Judiciary Committee. See S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998), and H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. I (1998). The Commerce Committee was concerned that section 1201, in its original form, might undermine Congress' commitment to fair use. While acknowledging that the growth and development of the Internet has had a significant positive impact on the access of students, researchers, consumers, and the public at large to information, the Committee was concerned that “marketplace realities may someday dictate a different outcome, resulting in less access, rather than more, to copyrighted materials that are important to education, scholarship, and other socially vital endeavors.” In order to address such possible developments, the Commerce Committee proposed a modification of § 1201 which it characterized as a “‘fail-safe’ mechanism.” In the words of the Committee Report, “This mechanism would monitor developments in the marketplace for copyrighted materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition against the act of circumvention to be selectively waived, for limited time periods, if necessary to prevent a diminution in the availability to individual users of a particular category of copyrighted materials.”
 
Accordingly, Congress enacted 1201(a)(1)(C), which requires the Register of Copyrights to conduct a rulemaking proceeding and, after consulting with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce, recommend to the Librarian whether he should conclude “that persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by the prohibition under [§ 1201(a)(1)(A)] in their ability to make noninfringing uses under [Title 17] of a particular class of copyrighted works.”
 
Based on these recomendations, the Librarian is empowered to grant exemptions for conduct that would otherwise violate 1201(a)(1). Such exemptions last for three year periods. “The goal of the proceeding is to assess whether the implementation of technological protection measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works is adversely affecting the ability of individual users to make lawful uses of copyrighted works .... The primary goal of the rulemaking proceeding is to assess whether the prevalence of these technological protections, with respect to particular categories of copyrighted materials, is diminishing the ability of individuals to use these works in ways that are otherwise lawful."
 
Unfortunately, the triennial rulemaking has been largely ineffective at protecting fair use and other noninfringing activities impaired by technical protection measures. First, the Librarian is not empowered to grant any exemptions to the trafficking prohibitions contained in 1201(a)(2) or 1201(b). Accordingly, only those who have the technological ability to circumvent are directly assisted by the exemptions. Second, the Copyright Office has imposed a heavy burden on those who seek exemptions.
 
The Librarian, acting on the recommendations of the Register of Copyrights, has granted the following exemptions:
 
====2000-2003 Exemptions====
1. Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software applications.
 
2. Literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness.
 
====2003-2006 Exemptions====
1. Compilations consisting of lists of Internet locations blocked by commercially marketed filtering software applications that are intended to prevent access to domains, websites or portions of websites, but not including lists of Internet locations blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to protect against damage to a computer or computer network or lists of Internet locations blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to prevent receipt of e-mail.
 
2. Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete.
 
3. Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have become obsolete and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access.
 
4. Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access controls that prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that prevent the enabling of screen readers to render the text into a "specialized format.
 
====Additional resources regarding DMCA triennial rulemaking:====
Copyright Office DMCA Rulemaking Page
 
Seth Finkelstein, How to Win (DMCA) Exemptions and Influence Policy
 
===Statutory Exceptions===
 
1201(d): Previewing by Libraries, Archives and Educational Institutions
 
1201(e): Law Enforcement, Intelligence and Government Activities
 
1201(f): Reverse Engineering
 
1201(g): Encryption Research
 
1201(h): Censorware
 
1201(i): Protection of Personally Identifying Information
 
1201(j): Security Testing
 
===Anti-Circumvention Cases===
    Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant Eric Corley and his company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc., for posting DeCSS on the 2600 website and for providing links to other websites on which DeCSS is posted. DeCSS is a program that circumvents a DVD’s CSS encryption technology, thereby allowing users to make copies of DVDs on their computers. After trial, the district court ruled that distribution of DeCSS violated 1201(a)(2), rejected First Amendment challenges to the application of the statute, and found that simply linking to DeCSS could, in some circumstances, constitute prohibited trafficking under 1201(a)(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
    United States v. Elcomsoft Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Elcomsoft, a Russian software company, was indicted by a federal jury for making available for purchase on the company website software that allegedly circumvented copyright protections on Adobe eBooks. The district court denied Elcomsoft’s motion to dismiss, finding that the DMCA bans all tools that circumvent technological protections, regardless of whether the tools are used to infringe copyrights or to enable fair use. The court also rejected Elcomsoft’s claims that the DMCA was too restrictive of its First Amendment rights and too vague to be enforced under the Fifth Amendment due process clause. A jury found defendants not guilty of five counts of copyright violations.
    RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000). The court granted a preliminary injunction against Streambox with respect to its Streambox VCR and Ferret products, and denied a preliminary injunction with respect to its Ripper software. The court found that the Streambox VCR violated the DMCA by circumventing copy controls placed by RealNetworks on streamed copyrighted materials so as to allow end users to make copies of the streamed files. However, the court held that defendant’s Ripper software, which converted media files between various formats including the RealMedia format, did not violate the DMCA. The court also held that defendant’s Ferret software, which altered the appearance and operation of RealNetworks’ media player, vicariously and contributorily infringed RealNetworks’ copyright in the player and created an unlawful derivative use.
    Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). Lexmark filed suit against defendants for copyright infringement and DMCA Section 1201 violations. Lexmark’s practice was to install chips in replacement toner cartridges that were necessary for the printer to function, thereby preventing Lexmark printer owners from buying replacement ink from third party manufacturers. Defendants manufactured and sold to toner manufacturers chips that allowed non-Lexmark ink cartridges to function in Lexmark printers. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed.
    Complaint, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. CV-0102669 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2001). Princeton University computer science professor Edward Felten filed a declaratory judgment action against the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) after the RIAA allegedly threatened Professor Felten with a lawsuit under the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA if he presented his paper revealing the weaknesses in digital copy protection technologies at a conference. Felten’s declaratory relief action claimed that the DMCA violated his First Amendment rights to publish his research. The court dismissed the case for lack of an actual controversy after the RIAA promised not to sue Felten for presenting the paper.
    Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Sony Computer Entertainment America (SCEA) sued defendant retailers of allegedly counterfeit products for violation of the DMCA, trademark infringement, and trademark counterfeiting. Defendants sold a “Game Enhancer” device that allowed consumers to configure their PlayStation console to play “import” games that SCEA did not intend to be played outside their geographical market of origin. The District Court granted SCEA’s motion for preliminary injunction, holding, inter alia, that defendants' sale of “Game Enhancer” violated the DMCA because "Game Enhancer appears to be a device whose primary function is to circumvent 'a technological measure (or a protection afforded by a technological measure) that effectively controls access to a system protected by a registered copyright....' 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)." Id. at 987.
    321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of movies studios, finding that distribution of DVD copying software violated 1201(a)(2) and (b). The court found that authority of DVD purchasers to access their own DVDs did not protect 321 Studios and rejected constitutional challenges based on the First Amendment and Copyright and Commerce Clauses. See also Paramount Pictures, Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004) (injunction against manufacturing or distributing DVD-copying software).
    Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 326 (D.Me. 2003). Pearl Investments (“Pearl”), a developer of automated stock-trading computer systems, sued Standard I/O (“Standard”), a custom software company, and its owner (collectively called “defendants”). One of Pearl’s assertions was that defendants violated the DMCA by circumventing the protections of Pearl's password-protected, encrypted virtual private network (“VPN”) to gain unauthorized access to information that included Pearl's copyrighted software. Defendants sought summary judgment (“S/J”) on the DMCA claim. The District Court held, inter alia, that, as a matter of first impression, Pearl’s VPN was protected by DMCA's anti-circumvention provision because the “VPN, as described by Pearl, squarely fits the definition of ‘a technological protection measure put in place by a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work.’” Id. at 350. The court granted Standard’s S/J motion on the DMCA claim but not its owner’s because “the conduct in issue is that of Chunn [Standard’s owner], qua individual, and that Pearl's evidence and arguments fall short of creating a triable issue as to Standard's liability.” Id. at 349.
    I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Systems, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd., (“plaintiff”), a provider of advertising tracking services, sued Berkshire Information Systems, Inc., (“defendant”), a competitor, alleging copyright violations through unauthorized use of plaintiff's computer system and its contents. Defendant obtained and used a password issued by plaintiff for tracking advertising information and allegedly copied features of plaintiff's service in developing its competitive service. The court held that defendant “did not ‘circumvent’ technological measure[s] that effectively controlled access to copyrighted work, in violation of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)." Id. at 521. The court stated that DMCA required defendant to avoid or bypass protective technological measures.
    Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff-appellees Davidson & Associates (“plaintiffs”), owners of copyrights in computer game and online gaming software sued creators of an alternative online service for circumvention of copyright protection system, trafficking in circumvention technology, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs created Battle.net, “a free service that allows owners of [plaintiffs’] games to play each other on their personal computers via the Internet.” Id. at 633. Defendant-appellants Jung et al. (“defendants”) created bnetd.org, an online service that “attempted to mirror all of the user-visible features of Battle.net” and allowed users to access the online gaming mode without the need for plaintiffs’ encoded identification key. The court held that defendants' development of the alternative service violated DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions.
    Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Court affirmed summary judgment for Defendant on other grounds, finding that in order for a plaintiff to bring a successful claim under Section 1201, it needed to show that the act of circumvention or device that circumvented the copy-protection technology at issue also "facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act" and thus creates a nexus between the circumvention and copyright protection. Since access to the garage door opening software in the instant case did not facilitate infringement of the software in any way, no claim under Section 1201 could stand.
    Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit affirmed its holding in Chamberlain that any act of circumvention or circumvention device must facilitate infringement of a protected right under the Copyright Act in order for Section 1201 to be violated. Finding that Section 117 protected Defendants' actions from any claim of infringement, the Court reversed the preliminary injunction granted by the court below. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed plaintiff's DMCA claim, noting that it had not shown any evidence of the alleged circumvention facilitating infringement. It also found that under a theory similar to that in the Lexmark case, much of the software allegedly protected by the technological measure was "freely available" in an unrestricted format on the hard drive and floppy disks that the Plaintiff provided to all its customers. Finally, the court distinguished this case from the Davidson case by noting that in that case, the copyrighted works were "not freely available," even to purchasers of the product.
    Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP, 401 F.Supp.2d 105 (D.D.C. 2005). The court cited with approval I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Systems, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), holding that defendants’ use of “a username/password combination as intended--by entering a valid username and password, albeit without authorization--does not constitute circumvention under the DMCA.” Id. at 113.
    Auto Inspection Services, Inc. v. Flint Auto Auction, Inc., 2006 WL 3500868 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against defendants for violation of the DCMA concerning plaintiff’s automotive inspection program. The court found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant circumvented a technological measure that controlled access to plaintiff’s source code and thus dissolved a temporary restraining order against defendant and denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
 
==Webcasting==
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act sets a statutory procedure for obtaining a license for webcasts, 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2), with a lengthy list of requirements to qualify for the statutory license for webcasting. 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(A); (d)(2)(C). The requirements include:
 
    The payment of royalties as set by the negotiated or statutory rate;
    A webcaster may not play in any three-hour period (1) more than three songs from a particular album, including no more than two consecutively, or (2) four songs by a particular artist or from a boxed set, including no more than three consecutively. This limit is called the "sound recording performance complement;"
    Prior announcements of when a song will be played are not permitted;
    Programs that are posted on a website for listeners to hear repeatedly on-demand may not be less than five hours in duration;
    Looped or continuous programs may not be less than three hours in duration;
    When performing a sound recording, a webcaster must identify the sound recording, the album, and the featured artist, if receivers of the service are capable of displaying this information;
    A webcaster may not perform a sound recording in a way that falsely suggests a connection between the copyright owner or recording artist and a particular product or service; and
    A webcaster must accommodate and cooperate with certain technical copyright protection measures.
 
==Vessel Hull Design Protection==
Listed for completeness, the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act provides sui generis protection for vessel hulls (overriding the result of Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989)). See http://www.copyright.gov/reports/vhdpa-report.pdf

Latest revision as of 11:00, 30 October 2011

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a United States copyright law that implements two 1996 treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It criminalizes production and dissemination of technology, devices, or services intended to circumvent measures (commonly known as digital rights management or DRM) that control access to copyrighted works. It also criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not there is actual infringement of copyright itself. In addition, the DMCA heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet. Passed on October 12, 1998 by a unanimous vote in the United States Senate and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998, the DMCA amended Title 17 of the United States Code to extend the reach of copyright, while limiting the liability of the Online service provider for copyright infringement by their users.

On May 22, 2001, the European Union passed the Copyright Directive or EUCD, which addresses some of the same issues as the DMCA. The DMCA's principal innovation in the field of copyright, the exemption from direct and indirect liability of internet service providers and other intermediaries (Title II of the DMCA), was separately addressed, and largely followed, in Europe by means of the separate Electronic Commerce Directive. (Unlike U.S. federal laws and regulations, the execution of European Union directives usually requires separate legislation by or within each of the Union's member states.)

Provisions

Title I: WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act

DMCA Title I, the WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act, amends U.S. copyright law to comply with the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted at the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in December 1996. The treaties have two major portions. One portion includes works covered by several treaties in U.S. copy prevention laws and gave the title its name. For further analysis of this portion of the Act and of cases under it, see WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act.

The second portion is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. However, section 1201(c) of the title clarified that the title does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses. The title contains other limitations and exemptions, including for research and reverse engineering in specified situations.

Title II: Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act

DMCA Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act ("OCILLA"), creates a safe harbor for online service providers (OSPs, including Internet service providers against copyright liability if they adhere to and qualify for certain prescribed safe harbor guidelines and promptly block access to allegedly infringing material (or remove such material from their systems) if they receive a notification claiming infringement from a copyright holder or the copyright holder's agent. OCILLA also includes a counternotification provision that offers OSPs a safe harbor from liability to their users upon notice from such users claiming that the material in question is not, in fact, infringing. OCILLA also provides for subpoenas to OSPs to provide their users' identity.

Title III: Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act

DMCA Title III modified section 117 of the copyright title so that those repairing computers could make certain temporary, limited copies while working on a computer. It reversed the precedent set in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).

Title IV: Miscellaneous Provisions

DMCA Title IV contains an assortment of provisions:

  • Clarified and added to the duties of the Copyright Office.
  • Added ephemeral copy for broadcasters provisions, including certain statutory licenses.
  • Added provisions to facilitate distance education.
  • Added provisions to assist libraries with keeping phonorecords of sound recordings.
  • Added provisions relating to collective bargaining and the transfer of movie rights.

Title V: Vessel Hull Design Protection Act

DMCA Title V added sections 1301 through 1332 to add a sui generis protection for boat hull designs. Boat hull designs were not considered covered under copyright law because they are useful articles whose form cannot be cleanly separated from their function.

Anti-circumvention exemptions

In addition to the safe harbors and exemptions the statute explicitly provides, 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) requires that the Librarian of Congress issue exemptions from the prohibition against circumvention of access-control technology. Exemptions are granted when it is shown that access-control technology has had a substantial adverse effect on the ability of people to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted works.

The exemption rules are revised every three years. Exemption proposals are submitted by the public to the Registrar of Copyrights, and after a process of hearings and public comments, the final rule is recommended by the Registrar and issued by the Librarian. Exemptions expire after three years and must be resubmitted for the next rulemaking cycle. Consequently, the exemptions issued in the prior rulemakings, in 2000, 2003 and 2006 are no longer valid.

The current administratively-created exemptions, issued in July 2010, are:

  • Motion pictures on DVDs that are lawfully made and acquired and that are protected by the Content Scrambling System when circumvention is accomplished solely in order to accomplish the incorporation of short portions of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism or comment, and where the person engaging in circumvention believes and has reasonable grounds for believing that circumvention is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the use in the following instances:
    • Educational uses by college and university professors and by college and university film and media studies students;
    • Documentary filmmaking;
    • Noncommercial videos. (A new exemption in 2010, similar to a previous educational exemption.)
  • Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, with computer programs on the telephone handset. (A new exemption in 2010.)
  • Computer programs, in the form of firmware or software, that enable used wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telecommunications network, when circumvention is initiated by the owner of the copy of the computer program solely in order to connect to a wireless telecommunications network and access to the network is authorized by the operator of the network. (Revised from a similar exemption approved in 2006.)
  • Video games accessible on personal computers and protected by technological protection measures that control access to lawfully obtained works, when circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose of good faith testing for, investigating, or correcting security flaws or vulnerabilities, if:
    • The information derived from the security testing is used primarily to promote the security of the owner or operator of a computer, computer system, or computer network; and
    • The information derived from the security testing is used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate copyright infringement or a violation of applicable law. (A new exemption in 2010.)
  • Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete. A dongle shall be considered obsolete if it is no longer manufactured or if a replacement or repair is no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace. (A renewed exemption from 2006, based on a similar exemption approved in 2003.)
  • Literary works distributed in e-book format when all existing e-book editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access controls that prevent the enabling either of the book’s read-aloud function or of screen readers that render the text into a specialized format. (A renewed exemption from 2006, based on a similar exemption approved in 2003.)

The Copyright Office approved two exemptions in 2000; four in 2003; six in 2006 and 2010. In 2000, the Office exempted (a) "Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software applications" (renewed in 2003 but not renewed in 2006); and (b) "Literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness." (revised and limited in 2003 and again in 2006). In 2003, the 2000 "literary works including computer programs" exemption was limited to "Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete" and this exemption was renewed in both 2006 and 2010. The 2003 exemption for text readers of ebooks was renewed in both 2006 and 2010. The 2003 exemption for obsolete software and video game formats was renewed in 2006 but was not renewed in 2010. The 2000 filtering exemption was revised and renewed in 2003, but was not renewed in 2006. The 2006 exemption for sound recordings allowed after security flaws were found in Sony BMG CD copy protection scandal on some Sony CDs was not renewed in 2010. An exemption covering the audiovisual works included in the educational library of a college or university’s film or media studies department was not renewed in 2010. This exemption was replaced with an exemption on DVDs protected by the Content Scrambling System when circumvention is for the purpose of criticism or comment using short sections, for educational, documentary or non-profit use. The 2006 exemption for wireless handsets connecting to wireless networks was revised in 2010 to specify used handsets and require authorization from the wireless network operator. Another exemption for wireless handsets was introduced in 2010 specific to interoperability software on the phone itself.

Linking to infringing content

The law is currently unsettled with regard to websites that contain links to infringing material; however, there have been a few lower-court decisions which have ruled against linking in some narrowly prescribed circumstances. One is when the owner of a website has already been issued an injunction against posting infringing material on their website and then links to the same material in an attempt to circumvent the injunction. Another area involves linking to software or devices which are designed to circumvent DRM (digital rights management) devices, or links from websites whose sole purpose is to circumvent copyright protection by linking to copyrighted material.

There have been no cases in the US where a website owner has been found liable for linking to copyrighted material outside of the above narrow circumstances.

Notable court cases

Edelman v. N2H2

In July 2002, American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on the behalf of Benjamin Edelman, a computer researcher at Berkman Center for Internet and Society, seeking a Declaratory judgment to affirm his first amendment rights when reverse engineering the censorware product of defendant N2H2 in case he intended to publish the finding. N2H2 filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted.

RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, Inc.

In August 2009, the DVD Copy Control Association won a lawsuit against RealNetworks for violating copyright law in selling its RealDVD software, allowing users to copy DVDs and store them on a harddrive. The DVD Copy Control Association claimed that Real violated the DMCA by circumventing anti-piracy measures ARccOS Protection and RipGuard, as well as breaking Real's licensing agreement with the MPAA's Content Scrambling System.

Viacom Inc. v. YouTube, Google Inc.

On March 13, 2007, Viacom filed a lawsuit against YouTube and its corporate parent Google for copyright infringement seeking more than $1 billion in damages. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Viacom claims the popular video-sharing site was engaging in "massive intentional copyright infringement" for making available a contended 160,000 unauthorized clips of Viacom's entertainment programming. Google lawyers say they are relying on the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act to shield them from liability.

On June 23, 2010, U.S. District Judge Louis Stanton granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court held that YouTube is protected by the safe harbor of the DMCA. Viacom has said that it will appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as soon as possible.

IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.

On June 23, 2006 IO Group, Inc. filed a complaint against Veoh Networks, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for California's Northern District. IO Group alleged that Veoh was responsible for copyright infringement by allowing videos owned by Io Group to be accessed through Veoh's online service without permission over 40,000 times between the dates June 1 and June 22.

Veoh is a Flash video site relying on user contributed content. IO Group argued that since Veoh transcoded user uploaded videos to Flash format it became a direct infringer and the materials were under their direct control, thereby disqualifying them for DMCA safe harbor protection.

The ruling judge disagreed with the argument, stating that "Veoh has simply established a system whereby software automatically processes user-submitted content and recasts it in a format that is readily accessible to its users. Veoh preselects the software parameters for the process from a range of default values set by the thirdparty software... But Veoh does not itself actively participate or supervise the uploading of files. Nor does it preview or select the files before the upload is completed. Instead, video files are uploaded through an automated process which is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users."

The Court has granted the Veoh's motion for summary judgment, on the basis of the DMCA, holding that the defendant's video-sharing web site complied and was entitled to the protection of the statute's "safe harbor" provision. Even though Veoh won the court case, it blamed the litigation as one of the causes of its preparing to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy and its subsequent sale to Qlipso.

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.

After numerous DMCA takedown notices in response to his eBay listings, Timothy S. Vernor sued Autodesk in August 2007 alleging that Autodesk abused the DMCA and disrupted his right to sell used software he bought at a garage sale. In May 2008, a federal district judge in Washington State dismissed Autodesk's argument that the software's license agreement preempted the seller from his rights under the first-sale doctrine. In September 2010, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions."

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.

In 2007, Stephanie Lenz, a writer and editor from Gallitzin, Pennsylvania made a home video of her 13-month-old son dancing to "Let's Go Crazy" and posted a 29-second video on the video-sharing site YouTube. Four months after the video was originally uploaded, Universal Music Group, which owned the copyrights to the song, ordered YouTube to remove the video enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

Lenz notified YouTube immediately that her video was within the scope of fair use, and demanded that it be restored. YouTube complied after six weeks—not two weeks, as required by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act—to see whether Universal planned to sue Lenz for infringement. Lenz then sued Universal Music in California for her legal costs, claiming the music company had acted in bad faith by ordering removal of a video that represented fair use of the song.

In August 2008, U.S. District Judge Jeremy Fogel of San Jose, California ruled that copyright holders cannot order a deletion of an online file without determining whether that posting reflected "fair use" of the copyrighted material.

On February 25, 2010, Judge Fogel issued a ruling rejecting several of Universal's affirmative defenses, including the defense that Lenz suffered no damages.

Criticisms

Takedown Notice

The DMCA has been criticized for making it too easy for copyright owners to encourage website owners to take down allegedly infringing content and links which may in fact not be infringing. When website owners receive a takedown notice it is in their interest not to challenge it, even if it is not clear if infringement is taking place, because if the potentially infringing content is taken down the website will not be held liable. The Electronic Frontier Foundation senior IP attorney Fred von Lohmann has said this is one of the problems with the DMCA.

Google asserted misuse of the DMCA in a filing concerning New Zealand's copyright act, quoting results from a 2005 study by Californian academics Laura Quilter and Jennifer Urban based on data from the Chilling Effects (group) clearinghouse. Takedown notices targeting a competing business made up over half (57%) of the notices Google has received, the company said, and more than one-third (37%), "were not valid copyright claims."

Effect on Analog Video Equipment

Analog Copy Protection (ACP), the encryption technology created by Rovi Corporation (Formerly Macrovision), is designed to thwart users' attempts to reproduce content via analog cables. When a DVD is played through an analog video cable and recorded using a VCR, Rovi’s ACP technology will distort the copy partially or completely.

The technology works by adding additional lines to the video signal. In the NTSC video standard, blank lines (vertical blanking intervals) that the user cannot see are used for functions like closed captioning. Rovi Corporation uses these blank lines to implement its ACP technology.

The implementation of ACP has been ill-regarded by some video enthusiasts. Many claim that the technology has led to signal issues with VCRs and analog video equipment. Some VCRs misread the encryption used to prevent copying, distorting the video image regardless of whether the recording is original or a copy.

The DMCA has been criticized for forcing all producers of analog video equipment to support the proprietary copy protection technology of Rovi Corporation, a commercial firm. The producers of video equipment are forced by law to support and implement the corporation's proprietary technology. This benefits Rovi Corporation financially, whereas those forced to implement it receive neither profit nor receive compensation.

Additionally, some criticize the implementation of ACP as a violation of their fair use rights. A recently developed TV-streaming product called the Slingbox uses analog signals to convey video from television to a mobile device. However, the encryption used by ACP blocks analog transmission, rendering the Slingbox unusable. Additionally ACP blocks the use of recording for educational purposes. On one or more accounts, students have not been able to cite and record cable sources properly due to ACP restrictions.

Effect on research

The DMCA has had an impact on the worldwide cryptography research community, since an argument can be made that any cryptanalytic research violates, or might violate, the DMCA. The arrest of Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov in 2001, for alleged infringement of the DMCA, was a highly publicized example of the law's use to prevent or penalize development of anti-DRM measures. While working for ElcomSoft in Russia, he developed The Advanced eBook Processor, a software application allowing users to strip usage restriction information from restricted e-books, an activity legal in both Russia and the United States. Paradoxically, under the DMCA, it is not legal in the United States to provide such a tool. Sklyarov was arrested in the United States after presenting a speech at DEF CON (convention) and subsequently spent nearly a month in jail. The DMCA has also been cited as chilling effect (term) to legitimate users, such as students of cryptanalysis (including, in a well-known instance, Professor Edward Felten and students at Princeton University), and security consultants such as Niels Ferguson, who has declined to publish information about vulnerabilities he discovered in an Intel Corporation secure-computing scheme because of his concern about being arrested under the DMCA when he travels to the US.

Effect on innovation and competition

In at least one court case, the DMCA has been used by Open Source software projects to defend against conversion of software (i.e. license violations) that involved removal of copyright notices. This defense can be used even without timely copyright registration, and can generate attorney fee awards, which together make it a useful strategy for Open Source organizations.

Reform and opposition

There are efforts in Congress to modify the Act. Rick Boucher, a Democratic congressman from Virginia, is leading one of these efforts by introducing the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act (DMCRA).

A prominent bill related to the DMCA is the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA), known in early drafts as the Security Systems and Standards Certification Act (SSSCA). This bill, if it had passed, would have dealt with the devices used to access digital content and would have been even more restrictive than the DMCA.

On the tenth anniversary of the DMCA, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented harmful consequences of the anti-circumvention provisions. They document that the DMCA:

  1. stifles free expression, such as in its use against Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov, Princeton Professor Edward Felten, and journalists;
  2. jeopardizes fair use;
  3. impedes competition, such as blocking aftermarket competition in toner cartridges, garage door openers, and enforcing walled gardens around the iPod; and
  4. interferes with computer intrusion laws.

See also

Proposed US legislation
Related international law
Proposed international law
DMCA anti-circumvention cases
DMCA damages cases
DMCA notice-and-takedown issues

External links

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