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==Footnote 16== | ==Footnote 16== | ||
Information Technology - Security Frameworks in Open Systems - Non-Repudiation Framework (also ITU-T Recommendation X.813), ISO/IEC 10181-4 (1996); Warwick Ford, Computer Communications Security: Principles, Standard Protocols & Techniques 29-30 (1994) (1994) (hereinafter "Ford"); Michael S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability and Policy: Law and Policy of Certificate-Based Public Key and Digital Signatures 9 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 1994) (hereinafter "Baum"). Sender and recipient have a mutual incentive to use an authentication service to exclude disruption from third party intrusion, but a nonrepudiation service is used by sender or recipient adversely against the other, when one wishes to deny having made or received a communication and the other has an incentive to prove that it was made or received. See Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptographic Primer, The Internet and Business: A Lawyer's Guide to the Emerging Legal Issues 14 ( Joseph F. Ruh, Jr., ed., The Computer Law Association 1996). | Information Technology - Security Frameworks in Open Systems - Non-Repudiation Framework (also ITU-T Recommendation X.813), ISO/IEC 10181-4 (1996); Warwick Ford, Computer Communications Security: Principles, Standard Protocols & Techniques 29-30 (1994) (1994) (hereinafter "Ford"); Michael S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability and Policy: Law and Policy of Certificate-Based Public Key and Digital Signatures 9 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 1994) (hereinafter "Baum"). Sender and recipient have a mutual incentive to use an authentication service to exclude disruption from third party intrusion, but a nonrepudiation service is used by sender or recipient adversely against the other, when one wishes to deny having made or received a communication and the other has an incentive to prove that it was made or received. See Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptographic Primer, The Internet and Business: A Lawyer's Guide to the Emerging Legal Issues 14 ( Joseph F. Ruh, Jr., ed., The Computer Law Association 1996). | ||
Latest revision as of 12:26, 16 October 2014
Footnote 16
Information Technology - Security Frameworks in Open Systems - Non-Repudiation Framework (also ITU-T Recommendation X.813), ISO/IEC 10181-4 (1996); Warwick Ford, Computer Communications Security: Principles, Standard Protocols & Techniques 29-30 (1994) (1994) (hereinafter "Ford"); Michael S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability and Policy: Law and Policy of Certificate-Based Public Key and Digital Signatures 9 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 1994) (hereinafter "Baum"). Sender and recipient have a mutual incentive to use an authentication service to exclude disruption from third party intrusion, but a nonrepudiation service is used by sender or recipient adversely against the other, when one wishes to deny having made or received a communication and the other has an incentive to prove that it was made or received. See Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptographic Primer, The Internet and Business: A Lawyer's Guide to the Emerging Legal Issues 14 ( Joseph F. Ruh, Jr., ed., The Computer Law Association 1996).